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Purpose - The “Individual Preference Effect” (IPE: Faulmüller et al., 2010; 
Greitemeyer & Schulz-Hardt, 2003; Greitemeyer et al., 2003), a form of confirmation bias, is 
an important barrier to achieving improved group decision-making outcomes in Hidden 
Profile tasks. Group members remain committed to their individual preferences and are 
unable to disconfirm their initial suboptimal selection decisions, even when presented with 
full information enabling them to correct them, and even if the accompanying group 
processes are perfectly conducted. This paper examines whether a mental simulation can 
overcome the IPE. 
Design/Methodology/Approach – Two experimental studies examine the effect of a 
mental simulation intervention in attenuating the IPE and improving decision quality in an 
online individual Hidden Profile task. 
Findings – Individuals undertaking a mental simulation achieved higher decision 
quality than those in a Control condition and experienced a greater reduction in confidence in 
the Suboptimal solution.  
Originality – To the authors’ knowledge, no study has examined whether mental 
simulation can attenuate the IPE. 
Research limitations/implications – Results suggest a role for mental simulation in 
overcoming the IPE. The test environment is an online individual decision-making task and 
broader application to group decision-making is not tested. 
Practical Implications – Since mental simulation is something we all do, it should 
easily generalise to an organisational setting to improve decision outcomes. 





We make thousands of decisions every day, alone or in tandem with others (Latham, 
2015; Ryan, 2018). Yet research shows that human decision-making is unreliable at best and 
our cognitive biases can significantly prejudice decision quality (Arnott, 2006). These biases 
can be compounded when the information used to make decisions is imperfect, or not 
uniformly distributed in instances where decisions are being made with others, for example, 
where one party to the decision knows something different to the other party[ies] 
(Information Asymmetry: Akerlof, 1970), as in group decision-making.  
The Hidden Profile 
In social psychology, asymmetric information has been conceptualised in group 
decision-making research using Hidden Profile (HP) decision tasks (Stasser & Titus, 1985). 
Such tasks always have an “optimal” answer, however, information is distributed 
asymmetrically between group members: some being shared amongst all members, whilst 
other information is partially shared or unique, known to only one group member. Groups 
may arrive at the optimal solution only by pooling and integrating information well enough to 
highlight the unique information, positive or negative, each member possesses, which is 
critical to an optimal decision outcome. Information integration has been identified as 
particularly important in many organizational contexts, including new product quality and 
development (White et al., 2008; Xiao et al., 2013)  
The decision task is further complicated since the individual information sets held by 
each group member point to a different decisional outcome than the group’s full information 
set (Brodbeck et al., 2007), with individual group members being oriented towards an initial, 
suboptimal solution. Research shows HP groups have a difficult time finding the optimal 
answer: in a meta-analysis of 65 studies covering 25 years of HP research, Lu et al. (2012) 
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concluded HP groups were eight times less likely to find the solution than groups having full 
information (‘Manifest Profile’ groups). 
Numerous reasons linked to biases and heuristics operating amongst individual group 
members, and within the group, have been advanced for the failure of HP groups, influencing 
what, and how, information is shared. Brodbeck et al. (2007) categorised these into: (i) 
negotiation focus; and (ii) discussion bias, operating at the group level of information 
processing; and (iii) evaluation bias, operating at the individual processing level. In 
negotiation focused processing, group members share only information that will help them 
identify and achieve the majority group verdict, even when that verdict is suboptimal. 
Information shared is largely based on individual (suboptimal) preferences and opinions 
(Gigone & Hastie, 1997) and shared information supporting those preferences. Discussion 
bias leads groups to spend more time discussing shared versus unique information (Larson et 
al., 1996). Evaluation biases favour (i) shared information; and (ii) preference consistent 
information (Brodbeck et al., 2007). Such information provides social validation as it can be 
corroborated by others (Wittenbaum et al., 1999). Finally, individuals evaluate information as 
more credible when it is consistent with their personal opinions (Greitemeyer & Schulz-
Hardt, 2003). 
The Individual Preference Effect 
The “Individual Preference Effect” (IPE: Faulmüller et al., 2010; Greitemeyer & 
Schulz-Hardt, 2003) has been identified as an important barrier to decision quality in Hidden 
Profile tasks. The IPE manifests itself such that group members are unable to disconfirm their 
initial suboptimal selection decisions, and remain committed to these, even when presented 
with full information enabling them to correct them, and even if the accompanying group 
processes are perfectly conducted.  
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Faulmüller et al. (2010) suggested the IPE is largely driven by preference consistent 
evaluation of information. Individual group members enter the group discussion with an 
initial (usually suboptimal) preference, which leads to biased evaluation of the information 
emerging during the group discussion, (i.e. group members prefer information consistent with 
their initial preference). Research  emphasizes the importance of the initial preference and its 
subsequent effect on group decision outcomes. Faulmüller et al. highlighted, through a 
comparison against real interacting groups, that almost half of all groups would fail to solve 
the HP as a consequence of the IPE, even when all information was exchanged and no co-
ordination losses occurred.  
The adverse impact of all group members entering the group discussion favouring the 
suboptimal solution may go beyond just poor decision outcomes to more serious 
organizational consequences. For example, Glebovskiy (2018) noted that “social cascades”, 
whereby other group members begin to coalesce around the same opinion, identifying and 
aligning with other group members’ values and perceptions, may be a contributing factor to 
group polarisation and groupthink. Glebovskiy highlighted such cascades may have 
informational antecedents if group members lack full information and are making their 
decision based on the opinions of others or the majority (as often happens in group HP tasks). 
Faulmüller and colleagues speculated an underlying cause of the IPE was differing 
amounts of cognitive resources being allocated to processing preference consistent versus 
inconsistent information: preference consistent information matches with prior beliefs: there 
is no need to challenge it - it can be accepted easily and quickly. Conversely, information 
which is not congruent with prior beliefs requires more cognitive resources to examine and, 
consequently, the acceptance process is more difficult.  
In HP tasks, individual group members are, generally, firstly oriented towards a 
suboptimal solution. Consequently, the majority enter the group discussion favouring a 
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suboptimal solution, which then biases the ensuing group discussion in an unfavourable 
direction. Individuals are also very confident in the accuracy of that suboptimal solution. This 
research tests whether a mental simulation can reduce individuals’ confidence levels in their 
initial suboptimal preference, which may cause them to interrogate it and revise it. 
Cognitive Biases, Confidence and Mental Simulation 
Cognitive biases and group member confidence 
 
Cognitive biases - cognitions or mental behaviours that can lead to prejudiced 
decision-making (Arnott, 2006, p.59) - are inherent in human reasoning. Arnott highlighted 
confidence biases as particularly damaging: they increase a person’s belief in their own 
ability as a decision-maker and curtail the search for new information relating to the decision 
task. Block and Harper (1991) noted that “cognitive conceit”, including overconfidence in 
ones decision-making abilities, could decrease the likelihood of an individual seeking out 
potentially important information. Both could adversely affect the search for unique 
information, so important to optimal decision outcomes in HP tasks. Thus, reducing 
confidence may be one key to attenuating the IPE, if it can lead to improvements in 
information search and application. 
Mental Simulation 
Our research tests a mental simulation intervention in an HP hiring task in two 
individual online studies. Mental simulation - “imitative cognitive constructions of an event 
or series of events” (Gaglio, 2004. p.537) - has been shown to have important psychological 
and behavioural effects. Crisp et al. (2011) noted, “mental simulation is an essential element 
of the human experience and . . . a correspondingly critical component of behavioural change 
strategies” (p.261). The use of mental simulation gained prominence in the sports fields (e.g. 
Feltz & Landers, 1983) and health domains (e.g. Greitemeyer & Würz, 2006) and it has 
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proven effective across many psychological domains, for example, prejudice, (e.g. Crisp & 
Turner, 2012); and social judgments (e.g. Hopthrow et al., 2017).  
Counterfactual thinking 
 In Hidden Profile group decision-making, counterfactual thinking, (i.e. thoughts of 
what might have been, invoked by an event that nearly occurred), has achieved some positive 
results on decision quality, (e.g. Galinsky et al., 2000; Galinsky & Kray, 2004). A “what-if” 
scenario, wholly unconnected to the decision task the group and its members faces, is the 
mechanism through which a Counterfactual Mindset (“CFM”) has been induced in this 
research. Typically, participants read about “Jane”, who goes to a rock concert and sits in a 
designated seat. At some point she moves, a raffle is then drawn and either Jane wins a prize 
on the basis of her new seat number or does not win a prize but would have won had she 
remained in her original seat. Participants are asked to write down some of the “what-if” 
thoughts Jane might experience after the concert. The underlying theory maintains that 
perception and explanation of counterfactual alternatives (i.e. what if Jane had moved/not 
moved), primes a mental simulation mindset where converse alternatives are considered. This 
establishes a CFM that can be transferred to subsequent, unconnected tasks, bringing 
beneficial outcomes as a consequence of the ability to consider alternative outcomes. It is the 
process of thinking counterfactually, not the content/direction of counterfactual thoughts, that 
affects information sharing during [group] decision-making.  
Other research has, however, cast doubts on the positive efficacy of priming a CFM in 
HP tasks. For example, Liljenquist et al. (2004) found activating a CFM at the individual 
level negatively correlated with decision accuracy in HP groups and did not increase the 
number of shared and unique clues mentioned. Ditrich et al. (2019) found the interaction of a 
CFM X interpersonal focus prime led participants to display stronger bias in communication 
and preference towards their initial candidate preference, (i.e. effectively amplifying the IPE). 
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This highlights a continuing need to research more and effective mental simulation 
interventions in HP decision-making, providing the rationale for our studies. 
Mental simulation versus counterfactual thinking 
The mental simulation we introduce differs from priming a CFM in several key ways, 
making it a new, untested approach to solving Hidden Profile tasks. Our mental simulation is 
not disconnected from the decision task, as with a CFM; participants mentally simulate 
directly about the Hidden Profile decision task itself. Mentally simulating the experience 
directly serves as a substitute for the corresponding experience (Kappes & Morewedge, 
2016), evoking similar cognitive, physiological/behavioural consequences as having the real 
experience. 
Our mental simulation also relies on prospective hindsight (Mitchell et al., 1989). In 
this, it resembles a Premortem (Klein, 2003, p.98-101), a form of mental simulation 
previously identified as a way to overcome bias in organizational decision-making (Hunt et 
al., 2015), (although not, to our knowledge, empirically tested). Participants are asked to 
generate an explanation for a future event as if it had already happened – they go forward in 
time and then look back – unlike a CFM, which requires past reconstructions of unconnected 
events. In our mental simulation, the future event is also made certain – participants are told 
that the hiring decision they made has been a failure and asked to identify reasons why. The 
explanation is about what actually happened – rather than what might have happened. 
Mitchell et al. asserted that this could possibly engender more effort, since participants 
worked harder to explain a sure event more thoroughly than an uncertain one.  
As highlighted, participants in our studies are told that the hiring decision they have 
made has been a failure. This approach differs from many mental simulations, which invoke 
a positive outcome. Simulating the achievement of a desired outcome/behaviour  can make 
people feel better and less likely to work towards difficult goals or outcomes (e.g. Kappes & 
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Oettingen, 2011). Kappes and Morewedge (2016) noted that “simulating an undesired action 
may sometimes do more to prevent than produce it” (p.415).  Simulating failure may make 
decision-makers work harder to avoid it. 
Klein (2003) notes that when people scrutinize their own plans, they are usually not 
looking to find any problems and are already biased in favour of the plan – confidence biases 
are rife (i.e. the plan is “ours”, so it must be good (Brown, 1986)). Russo and Schoemaker 
(1992) suggested a number of mechanisms to combat overconfidence: (i) accelerated 
feedback: using a known outcome to get immediate feedback on the decision; (ii) 
counterargumentation: thinking up reasons why initial beliefs might be wrong; (iii) paths to 
trouble: identification of all paths to a specific fault or problem, including listing additional 
causes of the problem; and (iv) paths to the future: explicit scenario analysis setting out how 
the future might play out in one or other specific direction. The mental simulation tested here 
incorporates all of these mechanisms: having asked decision makers to look into the future: 
they are given immediate feedback (i.e. accelerated feedback) that their anticipated decision 
has failed and are asked to generate reasons for this (i.e. counterargumentation; paths to 
trouble) and potential solutions (i.e. paths to the future). Applying this to individual decision-
making, we anticipate that mental simulation will have a significant positive effect on 
overconfidence in individual decision-makers by leading them to interrogate and reconsider 
their initial Suboptimal Candidate selection. Specifically, our studies test whether the mental 
simulation attenuates the IPE by: (i) improving individual decision quality, so participants 
switch their selection to the Optimal Candidate; and (ii) reducing confidence in the individual 
participants’ initial Suboptimal Candidate selections.  
 
Overview and hypotheses 
 
Study 1 introduces and tests an entirely new approach to solving the Hidden Profile, 
examining whether a mental simulation intervention can attenuate the IPE. Study 2 replicates 
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Study 1, but with a participant sample required to be in full-time employment (not specified 
for Study 1). Both studies deployed a mixed design, involving a candidate selection task, with 
two information (between) conditions: (i) Manifest Profile (MP); (ii) Hidden Profile (HP); 
and two intervention (between) conditions: (i) Mental Simulation (MS); and (ii) Control (see 
Procedure below). Time was the within condition, for candidates in both conditions. 
Participants in the MP condition had two decision points: Final Decision Point (MP1), based 
on viewing full candidate information, aggregated in one bullet-point list, prior to the 
MS/Control task; and Final Decision Point (MP2), following the MS/Control task. 
Participants in the Hidden Profile Condition had three decision points: Initial Decision Point 
– based on viewing partial candidate information; Final Decision Point (HP1), based on 
viewing full candidate information distributed across four separate lists prior to the 
MS/Control task; and Final Decision Point (HP2) following the MS/Control task. (Table 1 
below). 
[Insert Table 1 Here] 
 
For Study 1 and 2 we hypothesized the effects of the MS Intervention as follows: 
H1: HP participants in the mental simulation condition making an initial Suboptimal 
Candidate selection will evidence significantly better decision quality, selecting the Optimal 
Candidate (A), following a mental simulation intervention. No significant difference for HP 
Control participants. 
H2: HP participants in the mental simulation condition will be significantly less 
confident in the Suboptimal Candidate (C) as ‘best for the job’ following a mental simulation 
intervention. No significant difference for HP Control Participants. 
H3: HP participants in the mental simulation condition will be significantly more 
confident in the Optimal Candidate (A) following a mental simulation intervention . No 






Participants and Design 
 
One hundred and sixty participants recruited from Prolific Academic took part in the 
experiment in return for a small monetary payment (78 males, 81 females, one undeclared; 
age range 18-63, Mage  = 34.14, SD = 10.22). The only stipulated criterion was that 
participants should be minimum age 18. Power analysis for a one-tailed chi-square test was 
conducted in G-POWER and determined a sufficient sample size of 36 using an alpha of 
0.05, power of 0.80 and a medium effect size (w = 0.3) (Faul et al., 2013). Note: we recruited 
for a larger participant sample in both studies to allow for the expected number of exclusions 
of participants in the Hidden Profile condition who failed the manipulation check (i.e. by not 
selecting (or maintaining their selection of) the Suboptimal Candidate (C)). 
Design was a mixed 2 (Information Condition: Manifest Profile (MP) vs. Hidden 
Profile (HP)) X 2 (Intervention Condition: Mental Simulation (MS) vs. Control) X (2) (Time: 
Final Decision Point (1), Final Decision Point (2) experimental design, with Decision Point 
as the within participants factor.  
Materials 
The HP decision task material was adapted from Baker (2010). Participants were 
asked to choose between three candidates – (A), (B) and (C) - for the position of president of 
a new campus of a university. Participants received a brief description of the job and key 
selection criteria: each candidate had 16 items of information drawn from interviews, 
references, personal observations, etc. Information described Candidate (A) as the optimal 
candidate for the role (eight favourable, four neutral, four unfavourable characteristics); 
Candidates (B) and (C) each had four favourable, eight neutral, four unfavourable 
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characteristics. All participants received full information on each candidate before making 
their final candidate choice.   
Procedure 
The study was presented online, using a specially designed individual online decision-
making tool created within the survey software (Nicholson et al., 2019 (unpublished)). 
Manifest profile (MP). 
Participants in the MP condition viewed a one-page list setting out full candidate 
information in bullet form, beginning with information about Candidate (A), then (B), then 
(C). Participants were told their information was identical to their fellow, (fictitious) group 
members and asked to make one individual candidate selection decision based on the full 
information held by them (MP1). 
Hidden profile (HP). 
Participants in the HP condition firstly made an initial selection, based on viewing 
partial candidate information on one single list, either W, X, Y, Z (presentation was 
randomized). Following this, they viewed their own information again, plus the information 
of their ‘fellow group members’ (they were told this information was not necessarily the 
same) – all lists W, X, Y Z (randomized presentation) - and were asked to review their initial 
candidate selection, specifically whether they wanted to maintain or change that selection. 
This constituted their Final Decision Point before the Intervention (HP1). 
Intervention/Control task. 
Participants then undertook an online MS or Control task. In the MS condition, 
participants were firstly asked to imagine they had proceeded with the hiring of their chosen 
candidate and that we were “fast-forwarding” to the candidate’s 12-month probationary 
review. They were told the last year had gone badly, resulting in poor organizational 
outcomes. Participants were asked to identify all of the reasons they could think of as to why 
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this had occurred, based on the candidate attributes, and to briefly note these, typing their 
responses directly into the online survey. Next, participants briefly noted any potential 
solutions to the situation they could derive from the candidate information (again, typing 
responses directly into the online survey). They were told these solutions could be based on 
the attributes of their chosen candidate, for example, management training, presentation 
training, etc., or that they could also consider attributes which the other two candidates (who, 
they were told, were both still available for hire) might better bring to bear on the problems 
identified.  
Participants in the Control condition undertook a word task and were asked to type 
into the online survey as many different words as possible summarising their experiences of 
providing data as a participant in psychological studies.  
Participants were then asked to consider carefully whether they wished to approve and 
retain their candidate post-probation, or amend their selection. 
Measures  
Decision quality. 
Decision quality was a dichotomous measure, based on whether participants selected 
the Optimal Candidate (A) (coded 1) or a Suboptimal Candidate (coded 0).  
Participant confidence in suboptimal/optimal candidate. 
The second dependent variable was participant confidence in the Candidates. 
Participants were asked to record their level of confidence in each candidate immediately 
prior to and after the Control/MS Intervention, responding to the statement “I think 
Candidate A/B/C would be the best person for the job”, on a 7-point Likert scale (1 = 
strongly disagree to 7 = strongly agree). We included this measure to understand how (i) the 
IPE and; (ii) the MS intervention, might affect participant confidence levels in the Optimal 
and Suboptimal Candidates.  
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The Suboptimal Candidate (C) manipulation was successful for participants in the HP 
condition. After viewing partial information, 80.95% of HP participants initially preferred 
Candidate (C), 2 (2, N = 84) = 86.86, p <.001 over Candidate (A) (4.76%) and Candidate (B) 
(14.29%.)  
Participants in the MP Condition overwhelmingly selected the Optimal Candidate (A) 
(82.89%) after viewing the full candidate attribute list, 2 (2, N = 76) = 84.94, p <.001, over 
Candidate (B) ( 3.95%) and Candidate (C) (13.16%).  
Finally, we examined the Final Candidate Selection for Hidden Profile (HP) 
participants - after viewing all candidate information across the four separate lists. The Chi-
square test remained significant, 2 (2, N = 84) = 16.36, p < .001. The Optimal Candidate (A) 
was preferred by 39.29% of HP participants following viewing all candidate attributes, versus 
Candidate (B) (13.10%) and Candidate (C) (47.62%).  
These findings were as anticipated: most participants in the Manifest Profile condition 
selected the Optimal Candidate (A), whereas in the Hidden Profile condition, most selected 
the Suboptimal Candidate (C) as suggested by the initial presentation of information, and 
maintained that suboptimal selection, even after viewing full information. 
Following the analytic approach of Faulmüller et al. (2010) and Toma & Butera 
(2009), 16 participants in the HP Condition were excluded from the individual analysis 
because they failed the HP Suboptimal Candidate manipulation after viewing only partial 
information, (i.e. they did not select Candidate (C)). This left 144 participants in the analysis, 
split between experimental conditions as follows: MP: N = 76; HP: N = 68. . 
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In order to assess the effectiveness of the online decision-making tool in triggering the 
IPE and successfully orientating participants towards the Suboptimal Candidate (C), we 
firstly ran a series of pre-tests in both Study 1 and 2, to answer the following questions: 
1) Did more participants in the MP Condition select the Optimal Candidate (A) than 
in the HP condition, after viewing full candidate information? 
2) Did more participants in the HP Condition select the Suboptimal Candidate (C) 
than in the MP condition, after viewing full candidate information? 
3) Were HP participants significantly less confident in the Optimal Candidate (A) as 
‘best for the job’ versus MP participants, after viewing full candidate information? 
4) Were HP participants significantly more confident in the Suboptimal Candidate (C) 
as ‘best for the job’ versus MP participants, after viewing full candidate information? 
Findings from these pre-tests for both studies are summarised in Table 2. 
[Insert Table 2 Here] 
 
Pre-testing supported our premise that our online decision-making tool induced the 
IPE and was a suitable task to test the efficacy of the mental simulation intervention.  
Post Intervention/Control Task 
We tested our specific directional hypothesis regarding improvements in decision 
quality for participants in the Hidden Profile condition following the Mental Simulation, 
isolating the effect to participants who initially preselected and maintained their Suboptimal 
Candidate (C) selection after viewing full candidate information. Since we are interested in 
testing the ability of the intervention to attenuate the IPE, we argue this is a reasonable 
approach: participants who made the correct selection having viewed all information cannot 
be operating under the influence of the IPE. Nor are participants in the Manifest Profile 
condition, who viewed all candidate attribute information presented on one page. This left 39 
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participants for analysis: 20 and 19 in the Control and MS conditions respectively. This 
subset of the data was used to test H1-H3. 
Information processing: decision quality 
H1 was supported by the data: 31.57% of HP Intervention participants switched from 
the Suboptimal (C) to Optimal Candidate (A) after the MS, solving the Hidden Profile, 
compared to 0% in the Control condition. We analysed the difference in decision quality pre 
and post the Intervention in a McNemar’s test. There was a significant difference in the MS 
condition, p = .031. The intervention attenuated the IPE, evidencing a positive effect on 
individual decision quality.  
Decision quality – manifest profile condition. 
 
For completeness, we examined the effect of the intervention on decision quality in 
the MP condition, comparing the number of participants who selected Optimal Candidate (A) 
prior to and after the MS/Control task. In the MP/MS condition, 31 participants selected the 
Optimal Candidate prior to the Intervention and 26 participants afterwards, a non-significant 
reduction, p = .125. In the MP/Control condition, 32 participants selected the Optimal 
Candidate prior to the Control task and 34 afterwards, p = .500.  
Decision Confidence  
Participant confidence in suboptimal candidate (C) – HP condition. 
H2 was supported by the data. HP participants in the MS condition were significantly 
less confident in Suboptimal Candidate (C) as ‘best for the job’ following the intervention. A 
paired samples t-test was significant, t(18) = 5.14, p < .001. There was no significant 
difference in the HP Control condition, t(19) = -.70, p = .494.  
Participant confidence in optimal candidate (A) – HP condition. 
H3 received only very weak support in the data: HP participants in the Mental 
Simulation (MS) condition were marginally more confident in Optimal Candidate (A) 
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following the intervention. A paired samples t-test was marginally significant, t(18) = -1.79, 
p = .090. There was also a marginally significant difference in the HP Control condition, 










[Insert Figure 1 Here - Landscape
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For completeness, we also analysed and summarise in Table 3 results for the MP 
condition for these same measures (Study 1 and 2): 
 





Overview and hypotheses 
 
In Study 2, we wanted to test whether the effect of the mental simulation intervention 
could be replicated and generalized to a sample population required to be in full-time 
employment. This was not a requirement in Study 1- although of course, we recognise that 
some participants in that Study may have been in full-time employment (employment data 
was not gathered).  
Furthermore, although the primary aim of Study 1 was to test the mental simulation 
intervention against the IPE in the Hidden Profile condition, analysis of results in the MP 
condition suggested an unintended consequence of the intervention (Table 3): MP participant 
confidence in the Optimal Candidate (A) was significantly reduced and a [non-significant] 
number of  MP participants switched their selection from the Optimal to Suboptimal 
Candidate following the intervention. Given that the intervention borrows from the 
Premortem (Klein, 2003) which has achieved success as a confidence reduction technique 
(Veinott et al., 2010), this result is, perhaps unsurprising. We therefore wanted to test 
whether the intervention would have a similar effect in a second study. 











Participants and Design 
 
Two hundred and eighty participants recruited from Prolific Academic took part in 
the experiment in return for a small monetary payment (142 males, 133 females, five 
undeclared; age range 20-64, Mage  = 34.29, SD = 9.26, one undeclared). Minimum age was 
stipulated as 18; exclusions were participants who undertook the previous studies and we 
specified eligible participants must be in full-time employment. We applied the Study 1 






Results replicated Study 1:  
(i) The Suboptimal Candidate (C) manipulation was successful for participants in the 
HP condition. Following partial information: 76.87% of HP participants initially preferred 
Candidate C, 2 (2, N = 147) = 125.43, p <.001 over Candidate (A) (12.24%) and Candidate 
(B) (10.88%).  
(ii) Participants in the MP Condition overwhelmingly selected Optimal Candidate (A) 
(80.45%) after viewing the full candidate attribute list. The Chi-square test was significant, 2 
(2, N = 133) = 132.92, p <.001. Candidate (B) = 9.02% and Candidate (C) = 10.53%.  
(iii) Finally, we examined the Final Decision Point Candidate Selection for Hidden 
Profile (HP) participants - after they had viewed all candidate information across the four 
separate lists. The Chi-square test remained significant, 2 (2, N = 147) = 34.16, p < .001. 
Optimal Candidate (A) was preferred by 41.50% of HP participants, versus Candidate (B) - 
10.88% and Candidate (C) - 47.62% (by chance, this was identical to Study 1).  
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As in Study 1, 34 participants in the HP Condition were excluded from the individual 
analysis for failing the HP suboptimal candidate manipulation. This left 246 participants in 
the pre-test analysis, split as follows: MP: N = 133; HP: N = 113. 
Pre-testing was completed as for Study 1 (Table 2). 
Post-Intervention/Control Task 
Following pre-testing, we applied the same exclusionary criteria to participants who 
did not maintain the Suboptimal Candidate (C) selection. This left 66 participants for 
analysis: 36 and 30 in the Control and Mental Simulation conditions respectively. This subset 
of data was used to test H1-H3. 
Information Processing: Decision Quality 
H1 was supported by the data: HP participants who underwent the mental simulation 
switched to the Optimal Candidate (A) significantly more frequently than HP participants 
who completed the Control task: 20% of HP MS participants switched from the Suboptimal 
Candidate (C) to the Optimal Candidate (A), solving the Hidden Profile, compared to 8.33% 
in the HP Control condition. A McNemar’s test revealed no significant difference in the 
Control condition, p = .250, and a significant difference in the MS condition, p = .031. The 
Intervention attenuated the IPE, evidencing a positive effect on decision quality. 
Decision quality – manifest profile condition. 
 
As in Study 1, we examined the effect of the intervention on decision quality in the 
MP condition. In the MP/MS condition, 50 participants selected the Optimal Candidate (A) 
before the intervention and 43 following the intervention, a non-significant reduction, p = 
.189. In the MP/Control condition, 57 participants selected Optimal Candidate (A) before and 




Decision Confidence  
Participant confidence in suboptimal candidate – HP condition. 
H2 was supported by the data: HP participants in the MS condition were significantly 
less confident in Suboptimal Candidate (C) as ‘best for the job’. A paired samples t-test was 
significant, t(29) = 3.13, p = .004, with no significant difference in the HP Control condition, 
t(35) = .15, p = .881. (Figure 1). 
Participant confidence in optimal candidate – HP condition. 
H3 was supported by the data: HP participants who underwent the MS intervention 
were significantly more confident in Optimal Candidate (A) as ‘best for the job’. A paired 
samples t-test was significant, t(29) = -2.10, p = .045. No significant difference was found in 
the HP Control condition, t(35) = -1.54 p = .132  (Figure 1).  
Discussion 
 
The experimental studies reported in this paper introduced and tested an entirely new 
approach to solving the Hidden Profile. Our aim was to examine whether a mental simulation 
intervention could attenuate the Individual Preference Effect, as a means of (i) improving 
individual decision quality amongst participants undertaking an online Hidden Profile 
decision task; and (ii) positively affecting participant confidence in the Optimal and 
Suboptimal Candidates. Most Hidden Profile interventions have been focused at group level, 
but we contend there has been insufficient focus on the individual group members, 
specifically, attenuating the IPE as a means of improving decision outcomes. Previous 
research (Gigone and Hastie, 1997) noted: “It was as if the group members exchanged and 
combined their opinions but paid little attention to anything else” (p.132). A ‘vicious circle’ 
is thus created, with the initial individual suboptimal decision at the start of it. The challenge 
is how to break this and the mental simulation tested here, against individual decision-
makers, offers one way. 
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It seems we cannot help but reject opinions and information which contradicts our 
own – which may offer one explanation for the IPE and individuals’ inability to shift from 
their initial preference in Hidden Profile tasks. A recent study of participant reaction times by 
Gilead et al. (2019) offers support for this idea. Gilead et al. found that the acceptance 
(rejection) of confirmatory (contradictory) opinions can occur rapidly and involuntarily. 
Participants made faster verifications of grammaticality of a statement when it matched their 
opinion: when a participant agreed with a stated opinion, it had a rapid and involuntary effect 
on how they cognitively processed it. This is particularly problematic, since the challenge in 
Hidden Profiles is for individuals to integrate and process alternative and contradictory 
information and viewpoints during group discussion, despite their pre-formed opinions. 
Accordingly, any intervention must find a way to allow – or force – individual group 
members to allocate more cognitive resources to the processing of preference inconsistent 
information, leading to a successful de-biasing of their opinion.  
Across both studies, participants in the Hidden Profile condition who underwent the 
mental simulation: (i) demonstrated improvements in decision quality, selecting Optimal 
Candidate (A) more frequently following the intervention; and reported (ii) increases in 
confidence in Optimal Candidate (A), and; (iii) decreases in confidence in Suboptimal 
Candidate (C) as ‘best candidate for the job’.  
Mental Simulation – a powerful intervention? 
There appear to be several reasons why the Mental Simulation may successfully 
achieve these effects. Firstly, it incorporates the cognitive remedies to overconfidence 
identified by Russo and Schoemaker (1992) and explained earlier in this paper. Second, 
imagining the failure of the Suboptimal Candidate (C) may highlight their unique (hidden) 
negative attributes, offsetting them against their minimal positive attributes, which are often 
repeated. Lightle et al. (2009) noted individuals were less likely to recall negative 
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information about their pre-discussion preferred candidate, relative to neutral information.  
The combination of our results on participant confidence in the Suboptimal Candidate (C) 
and improved decision-quality, suggests HP participants who underwent the Mental 
Simulation identified and applied newly acquired knowledge of the negative attributes of the 
Suboptimal Candidate to their decision-making processes, enabling them to disconfirm their 
initial suboptimal selection. Faude-Koivisto et al. (2009) noted that mental simulations can 
result in the generation and consideration of additional alternatives by enhancing open-
mindedness, due to the ability of mental simulation to create an “exploratory mind set” 
(p.74). Future studies could untangle this through the addition of a candidate attribute recall 
task, occurring after the Intervention. 
Third, the premise of the Mental Simulation, as applied in these studies, is that 
participants are asked to imagine the decision they have taken has gone badly wrong, 
resulting in poor organizational outcomes. This enables them to mentally simulate the failure 
of their decision, then solve to overcome that failure. We speculate that the impact of directly 
simulating a failed decision may have a more profound impact on decision-makers that 
priming a counterfactual mindset. Steinmetz et al. (2017) found that mentally simulating a 
visceral state (thirst) had a more profound effect than simply priming that state. By telling our 
decision-makers that their decision had failed, we provided them with an opportunity to 
mentally simulate that failure, and with an opportunity to correct it. Of course, the failure is 
not real – the mental simulation offers a proxy for the decision failure. Simulating possible 
future obstacles/challenges also provides an opportunity to plan to overcome and/or avoid 
them (Taylor et al., 1998). 
Fourth, the mental simulation incorporates “prospective hindsight”, defined as 
“generating an explanation for a future event as if it had already happened” (Mitchell et al., 
1989, p.25). As noted earlier, this can lead participants to think differently when the future 
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event is ‘certain’ rather than ‘may be’. Mitchell at el. manipulated certainty of an outcome and 
found participants generated more reasons when asked to explain outcomes presented as 
certain, versus uncertain. They also concluded that participants thought differently about such 
events, although could not conclude that prospective hindsight led to the generation of superior 
explanations for the event. In our studies, participants were asked to specifically imagine they 
had proceeded with the hiring of their first ranked candidate and to look forward 12-months. 
They were then presented with a picture of everything that had gone wrong during that time-
frame and asked to note all of the reasons why this might have happened. The generation of 
these reasons should lead to the emergence of more unique information.  
Limitations and future directions 
 
A limitation of these findings is the unlooked-for effect on confidence and decision 
quality for MP participants who underwent the mental simulation. As noted, the Premortem, 
on which the mental simulation is based, has achieved success as a confidence reduction 
technique (Veinott et al., 2010). These results underscore that. Although the reduction in the 
number of participants in the Manifest Profile condition selecting Optimal Candidate (A) 
following the intervention was not statistically significant, it is notable and must be 
acknowledged as a limitation of the intervention. Furthermore, MP participants who 
underwent the mental simulation reported significant reductions in confidence in Optimal 
Candidate (A). It is possible that a group discussion could ‘soften’ the impact of the mental 
simulation at the individual group member level, achieving the positive benefits we are 
looking for, without the ‘downsides’. Similarly, more experienced decision-making groups 
may be less ‘shaken’ by the failure frame of the mental simulation and therefore less inclined 
to make a complete ‘about turn’. This could be tested in future research. 
In summary, we believe our results with individual decision-makers are important in 
the context of interventions to improve group decision-making research. Faulmüller et al. 
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(2012) found participants showed a discussion bias favouring preference-consistent 
information without any incentive for biased communication, consistent with Gilead et al’s. 
(2019) findings regarding involuntary rejection of alternative and contradictory information 
and opinions noted above. The Mental Simulation attenuated the IPE, increasing the 
likelihood of individuals entering the group discussion favouring the Optimal versus 
Suboptimal Candidate. This should lead the group towards greater discussion of the Optimal 
Candidate, with more positive, unique information shared about that candidate, improving 
group decision-making outcomes. These studies open up a new and exciting line of research 
for the role of mental simulation in Hidden Profile decision tasks, offering a promising 
response to Greitemeyer & Schulz-Hardt’s (2003) admonition that “interventions should . . . 
be directed at debiasing . . .group members’ individual information processing” (p.337). 
Future research should build on these results by testing the mental simulation in face-to-face 
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